In this paper we present a framework for the specification of information flow properties for distributed systems. We consider partially specified distributed systems in which there are several unspecified components located in different places. As a case study, in this paper we consider the notion of Non Deducibility on Composition, N DC for short, originally proposed for nondeterministic systems and based on trace semantics. We study how this information flow property can be extended in order to deal also with distributed partially specified systems. In particular, we adapt the N DC property to distributed systems by distinguishing between two different approaches. The first one we call centralized N DC, according to which there is just one unspecified global component that has complete control of the n distributed locations where interaction occurs between the system and the unspecified component. The second one is called distributed N DC, according to which there is one unspecified component for each distributed location, and the n unspecified components are completely independent, i.e., they cannot coordinate or cooperate each other. Surprisingly enough, we prove that centralized N DC is as discriminating as decentralized N DC. However, when we move to bisimulation-based Non-Deducibility on Composition, BN DC for short, the situation is completely different: Indeed, we prove that centralized BN DC is strictly finer than distributed BN DC, hence proving the quite expected fact that a system that can resist to coordinate attacks is also able to resist to simpler attacks performed by independent entities.
Introduction
Information flow analysis is considered one of the main techniques for studying confidentiality in computer systems. Information flow properties aim at defining the way the information may flow among different entities of a compound system. For instance, these properties may define constraints on the kind of information flow that can be set among different groups of entities with different security levels (e.g., high and low). Usually, the goal is to prevent any possible flow from the confidential (high) level to the public (low) one.
Several formalizations have been proposed in the literature to capture the intuitive idea of flow of information. Most of them originate from the basic idea of Non Interference, N I for short, proposed in [10] on deterministic machines: basically one wants that low output variables do not depend on high inputs. This intuitive notion has been then extended to trace based models. Assume there are two groups of users, G and G , and, given any input sequence of actions γ, let γ be its subsequence obtained by deleting all the actions of a user in G. G is non interfering with G if and only if for every input sequence γ, the user in G obtains the same outputs after the execution of γ and γ .
This basic notion has been also adapted and generalized to the richer setting of nondeterministic and concurrent machines. Among the many definitions derived from N I, we consider the notion of Bisimulation Non Deducibility on Compositions, BN DC for short, proposed in [4, 6] : a system E is BN DC if E \ H (i.e., E where all high level actions are prevented) is bisimulation equivalent to E in parallel with any high level process Π where all the high actions in H are restricted (hence cooperation on high actions is forced). In other words, the low view of the behavior of system E is not modified by the presence of process Π, that can be considered as an intruder that tries to break the system. Observe that this definition is given by considering at most one possible intruder (high user).
The goal of this work is to extend the idea of BN DC also to distributed systems, where the possible intruders can be more than one and may also coordinate their effort. A distributed system is modelled as a transducer [11] , i.e., a context which can receive in input, say, n actions in different locations and which may produce a tuple of outputs. Intuitively, a context of the form C(X 1 , . . . , X n ) can be seen as a distributed partially specified system [13, 14, 15, 18] , i.e., a system C with holes, where the components X 1 . . . X n are not specified. These unspecified components are meant to be the potential intruders of the system. We want to study whether such contexts respect information flow properties, in particular those based on BN DC, whatever the possible intruders are.
We proceed by following two different approaches to the problem of extending BN DC to distributed partially specified systems. Given the context C(X 1 , . . . , X n ), where each X i denotes a hole in the system, we may define the distributed BN DC as the BN DC property where the n intruders act independently, without communicating or coordinating their activities. A system satisfying distributed BN DC should resist to distributed attacks conducted by n independent intruders. Then, we introduce the concept of centralized BN DC in which the n intruders are centrally controlled and thus considered as a unique context which performs a vector of n actions,ã = (a 1 , . . . , a n ). A system satisfying centralized BN DC should resist to distributed attacks conducted by n cooperating intruders (or by one single intruder that has complete control of the n locations in which interaction with the system is possible).
As expected, centralized BN DC is proved to be finer than distributed BN DC. Still, the weaker notion is meaningful because, as a matter of fact, a system that is centralized BN DC is able to resist also to strongly coordinated attacks that, in a real-life distributed environment, might not be possible. We provide a simple counterexample showing that the reverse implication does not hold, i.e., a context which is distributed BN DC, but not centralized BN DC.
Interestingly enough, when bisimulation semantics is replaced by the less discriminating trace semantics, the results above are completely different. In particular, we prove the quite surprising result that centralized N DC (i.e., trace-based Non-Deducibility on Composition) is as discriminating as decentralized N DC. This reinforces the need of bisimulation semantics in the study of information flow properties.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls some notions about context theory and introduces some idea behind the use of context for modelling distributed systems. Section 3 presents our framework for the specification of information flow properties in a distributed system. Section 4 shows a comparison with related work. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background
In this section we recall some preliminary notions about contexts theory by referring to [11] .
Context
First of all, we recall the definition of context.
n is a set of n-to-m contexts; Act is a set of actions; Act 0 = Act ∪ {0} where 0 ∈ Act is a distinguished no-action symbol, Act k 0 is a tuple of k actions ∈ Act 0 , and For (C,ã,b, C ) ∈→ n,m we usually write Cb − → a C , leaving the indices of → to be determined by the context, and we interpret this as:
Consuming the actionsã, the context C can produce the actionsb and change into C .
In a transduction Cb
− → a C , certain components inã and/orb can be 0 indicating that the corresponding internal process and/or external observer is not involved in the transduction. In particular the last condition of → n,m means that a context can always and only produce nothing without consuming anything.
In order to give some example of contexts, we present here how it is possible to see process algebra operators as contexts.
Example 2.2 CCS process algebra (see [17] ) can be seen as a context system with the following contexts: prefix a * ∈ C 1 1 for a ∈ Act, restriction \L ∈ C 1 1 where L ⊆ Act. Choice and parallel context +, ∈ C 1 2 ; inactiveÑ il ∈ C m n for any n and m. There are also the identity context I n ∈ C n n and the projection Π i n ∈ C 1 n . The semantics definition of CCS context is in Table 1. 3 Inaction:
Choice:
(1)
where i(a) ∈ Act n 0 with the i th component being a and all the others being 0. 
Operations between contexts
Several operations are allowed between contexts.
Composition of contexts
Contexts can be composed. 
. . , a n ) is a vector of actions.
We usually write C(P ) to denote a composed context; the combined process C(P ) is nothing but the composition C • P as follows form the context composition.
Example 2.4 In order to explain how the composition between contexts works, we recall an example given in [11] .
Let a.b.N il be a standard CCS term. It can be composed from the constructs as a * • b * • N il. Using the inference rule for composition, we can infer the following transitions:
Obviously, a composed context of the form I m • C has the same behavior of C itself.
Product of contexts
In order to represent a system with n holes, we use an n-to-
If m = 0 then we obtain a process. The context D, in this case, provides a simultaneous expansion of the n holes in C. To allow the expansion of the n holes to be carried out independently, it is defined an independent combination of n contexts as
. . , n and D i is intended as an expansion of the i'th hole of C in such a way m = i m i . This motivates the following construct of (independent) products of contexts. 
We usually write the combined process C(P 1 , . . . , P n ) as a shorthand for C •(P 1 ×. . .× P n ). Since we consider asynchronous contexts, it is not required that all the components P 1 , . . . , P n contribute in a transition of the combined process C(P 1 , . . . , P n ), i.e., some of the P i could perform a 0 action. Example 2.6 Also in this case, since in the rest of the paper composition and product operation are the most useful for our purposes, we recall an example already presented in [11] .
Let a.N il + b.N il be a standard CCS term. It can be composed from the constructs as
Using the inference rule for composition and product, we can 5 infer the following transitions:
where the behavior of
Feed-back on context
In order to deal with recursion, a construction of feed-back on contexts is defined, s.t. whenever C ∈ C n n then C † ∈ C n 0 and C † is equivalent to C • C † . Formally, we have the following definition.
) be a context system. A feed-back on C is a unary operation † , on contexts of C s.t., whenever C ∈ C n,n then C ∈ C n 0 . Furthermore, the transduction for a context C † with C ∈ C n n is fully characterized by the rule:
In order to understand the meaning of this operator we recall the following example (see [11] ).
Example 2.8 Let us consider the CCS process defined as X = a.X. It can be realized as the context (a * ) † . Indeed, using the inference rule of the feed-back, we obtain the following transition:
† and in fact this is the only transition for (a * ) † .
Open systems as transducers
According to [11] , the theory of contexts is useful to model and analyze distributed partially specified systems, i.e., systems in which more than one component is unspecified. As a matter of fact, a partially specified system can be formalized by contexts as a system of the form C(X 1 , . . . , X n ), where C denotes the known part of the system and X 1 , . . . , X n denote components still remaining unknown. In process algebra, the partial implementation C(X 1 , . . . , X n ) can be described as an expression with X 1 , . . . , X n as free variables that may be replaced by closed expression P 1 , . . . , P n . By syntactically replacing each X i by the corresponding P i , one yields the closed expression C(P 1 , . . . , P n ).
In this way we have a general framework that permits us to consider a complex and general scenario. Indeed, whether we consider a partially specified system, several scenarios can be considered in order to obtain a closed system. In the easiest case, the number of the unspecified components is one. In this case there is a unique hole that a process can fill in. On the other hand, if we consider a system in which there are several holes, we may distinguish from two different approaches for the analysis of such systems: by considering all n holes as a unique hole of cardinality n (in this case we put a central process that performs a vector of n actions), or by considering several independent unary processes whose product closes the expression.
• N il be two contexts. Let us consider a context C ∈ C 1 2 built as a composition of several contexts as follows:
Being ∈ C 1 2 and C 1 and C 2 in C 1 0 it is not difficult to see that C is effectively in C 1 2 . Here we have explicitly denoted by X 1 and X 2 the free variables of the contexts in order to make the context readable. X 1 and X 2 represent respectively the first and the second component of the context C ∈ C 1 2 . Informally, this context allows for the synchronization on actions h 1 , h 2 . This permits us, as we will see after, to control sequences of executions of low actions, such as l 1 and l 2 .
In order to obtain a closed expression we have to combine C with a context in C 2 0 . Such context could be a binary contexts such as, for instance,
Or the product of a couple of contexts in C 1 0 , for instance
As a matter of fact, the product P 1 × P 2 is a context in C 2 0 as required. In this case the closed expression is C • (P 1 × P 2 ).
Referring to Definition 2.3, the context C • P behaves according to the following rule:
where
Obviously this is the first transition. The rest of the transduction is omitted, but it is possible to calculate the following steps by applying the composition rule. At the end we obtain that the behavior of C(P ) has the same behavior of
This is the only sequence of actions allowed for this composition of contexts. As a matter of fact, informally, if C 2 pretends to perform the first action, it is forbidden by the restriction \ {h 1 ,h 2 ,h 1 ,h 2 } . Hence the first takes the first action from the first component producing the transition showed in Equation 1. A similar reasoning is made for the second and third steps of the computation, so the context performs l * 1 • τ . At this point the first component is reduced to N il so we have a synchronization on the second component and then the action l 2 is unblocked.
Let us now consider the distributed case. Referring to how the contexts are built, we have the following first transition:
It is possible to note that the first step is similar. There is a difference between the 7 behavior of C(P ) and C(P 1 , P 2 ) at the following steps of transduction. As a matter of fact, in the first case, we have to follow the behavior of P and C 1 , on the contrary, in the second case the second step could be performed by P 2 and C 2 . This crucial difference will be used in the following to prove a central result of this paper.
Behavioral equivalences
In order to have a method to compare behaviors of contexts, we recall some definition of behavioral equivalences. We start with the definition of trace equivalence for contexts. Let us start by giving some notations used in the following. Let us considerτ is a tuple of actions in which there are no actions different from τ or 0. Letã = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) be a vector of actions in Act n 0 , thenǎ =ã when a i = τ for all i = 1, . . . , n, orǎ =ã[0\τ ] where all the occurrences of the τ actions in the vector are replaced by the no action 0. In particularτ =τ , i.e., if the vector is composed only by τ or 0 actions, the substitution is not performed.
Then, notation Cτ =⇒ C denotes that C and C belongs to the reflexive and transitive 
iff T r(C) = T r(D).
Other behavioral equivalences are defined for contexts. We just recall the definitions of simulation and bisimulation equivalence (see [17] ) by distinguishing between a strong and a weak version. Definition 2.11 Let C = ( C m n n,m , Act, → n,m n,m ) be a context system. Then an n-tom strong simulation R is a binary relation on C m n s.t., whenever (C, D) ∈ R andã ∈ Act n 0 , b ∈ Act m 0 , then the following holds:
A strong bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R −1 are simulations. We represent with ∼ the union of all the strong bisimulations. Now we are able to give the definition of weak bisimulation by considering that, in the rest of the paper, we use it w.r.t. contexts in C n 0 . Hence we consider a definition that is an 8 extension of the definition of weak bisimulation given by Milner in [17] for processes, that, as we have already said, can be seen as contexts in C 1 0 . Definition 2.12 Let C = ( C n 0 0,n , Act, → 0,n 0,n ) be a context system. Then an 0-to-n weak simulation R is a binary relation on C n 0 s.t., whenever (C, D) ∈ R andã ∈ Act n 0 , then the following holds:
We write C D in case (C, D) ∈ R for some 0-to-n simulation R.
A weak bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R −1 are simulations. We represent with ≈ the union of all the bisimulations. 
The information flow properties
Information flow properties are a particular class of security properties which aim at controlling the way information may flow among different entities. They have been first proposed as a means to ensure confidentiality, in particular to verify if access control policies are sufficient to guarantee the secrecy of (possibly classified) information. Indeed, even if access control is a well studied technique for system security, it is not trivial to find an access control policy which guarantees that no information leak is possible.
In the literature, there are many different security definition reminiscent of the information flow idea, each based on some system model (see [4, 6, 12, 19] ). The central property is the Non Deducibility on composition (NDC, see [4] ): the low level users cannot infer the behavior of the high level user from the system because for the the low level users the system is always the same.
Exploiting the relation of bisimulation, we obtain the notion of Bisimulation Non Deducibility on Compositions, BN DC for short, proposed in [4, 6] as generalization of the classical idea of Non-Interference (see [10] ) to nondeterministic systems: Low level users cannot infer the behavior of high level users from the system because for low level users the system is always the same.
In the following we recall the definition of non interference as N DC and BN DC property proposed by Focardi and Gorrieri [3, 4, 5, 6 ].
N DC and BN DC property
To describe information flow property, we can consider two users, High and Low interacting with the same computer system. We wonder if there is any flow of information from High to Low.
In [3, 4, 5, 6] Focardi and Gorrieri propose a family of information flow security properties called Non Deducibility on Compositions (N DC, for short). Intuitively, a system is N DC if, by interacting with every possible high level users, it always appears the same to low level users. No information at all can be deduced by low level users. The above idea can be instantiated in a lot of ways, by choosing a particular way of interacting between systems and various criteria of equivalence. Firstly we consider the trace equivalence, thus the N DC is described in terms of contexts as follows:
where H is a set of high actions. N DC requires that high level processes Π are not able to change the low level behavior of the system represented by \ H (E). If it is equivalent to \ H ( (E × Π)) this clearly means that Π is not able to modify in any way the execution of E. Since the operational semantics of contexts respects the operational semantics of process algebras, it is possible to give the definition of N DC by using contexts.
We can obtain a bisimulation based N DC by simply substituting ≈ T with ≈. In particular Focardi and Gorrieri argue that BN DC is the right choice (see [5, 6] ). Hence they give a formulation of BN DC in terms of CCS parallel operator (see [17] ). Also in this case we give the definition of BN DC by exploiting the semantics of contexts as follows.
Definition 2.14 Let Sort(Π) be the set of actions that occurs in Π and let H be the set of high actions. Let C 1 0,H = {Π | Sort(Π) ⊆ H ∪ {τ }} be the set of High users. E ∈ C 1 0 is BN DC if and only if ∀Π ∈ C 1 0,H we have
Specification of Information flow property in a distributed system
In this paper we want to extend the definition of N DC and BN DC properties given for processes in order to deal also with distributed systems. In particular, we consider a partially specified system in which several components are unspecified. We describe it as a context. Then we wonder if the context is N DC and/or BN DC.
To focus on which kind of scenarios we are going to investigate we present the following example.
Example 3.1 In order to make this example readable we use the infix notation that is more suitable than the prefix one of the context theory.
Let us consider a system specified as follows:
Let us interpret l 0 and l 1 as bit 0 and 1 respectively. According to how we chose X 0 and X 1 it is possible to generate sequences of 0 and 1 obtaining (possible infinite) sequence of numbers that represent information that (indirectly) flows from high to low since it depends on the behavior of high agents and can be detected by low ones.
Specification of N DC in distributed systems
According to the definition of N DC (see [3, 4, 5, 6] ), there is an universal quantification on all possible high users. Hence it is possible to specify the N DC property as an open system S = \ H ( (E × )), where there is a hole in which we have to consider a high user. The system S has to satisfy the N DC property whatever the behavior of a high user is.
The scenario we want to analyze here consists in a system in which more than one high user acts on the system. A natural extension of this reasoning to a system in which there are more than one unspecified components, is considering these components as high users, i.e., if C ∈ C 1 n there are n high processes. In this section we present how the specification of the N DC property can be extended to consider systems with more than one high level user. We consider two different approaches: The centralized approach, CN DC, and the decentralized one, DN DC.
Firstly we give the following notational definition. Definition 3.2 Let H ⊆ Act be the set of high actions and let H n ⊆ Act n be the set of n-tuples of high actions. The context \ H n ∈ C n n is defined by the following rule:
whereã ∈ H n means that, beingã = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) there does not exists any a i ∈ H for i = 1, . . . , n.
Let us start with the centralized one.
As before we have a universal quantification into the specification that results difficult to manage. Referring to the theory developed in [8] , we want to give a static characterization of CN DC by using a particular context T op n ∈ C n 0 semantically defined as follows:
for anyã ∈ H n . This context allows for all possible n-tuple of high actions.
The following result holds, whose proof is postponed to the Appendix.
This means that the N DC property is statically characterized by the T op n context. In this way the universal quantification on all possible high users is embedded into the context T op n . Now, let us consider the decentralized approach.
. . , N il)
Also in this case, by exploit the context T op 1 we prove (see the Appendix) the following result.
Hence, also in the decentralized case, it is possible to statically characterize DN DC. In order to study the relation that exists between CN DC and DN DC we give the following proposition (proof in the Appendix).
Hence there is no difference between the two approaches if we consider the trace equivalence as behavioral relation between contexts in the analysis of the information flow properties.
In the next subsection, we will show that this is no longer the case if bisimulation is used in place of trace semantics. Hence, according to what Focardi and Gorrieri have already concluded about the analysis of open system with only one high user ( [5, 6] ), also in presence of several high components, the BN DC property turns out to be more interesting than N DC.
Specification of BN DC in distributed systems
According to [7, 13, 14, 15, 18] , the BN DC property can be analyzed by using the open system paradigm (see [13, 14, 15, 18] ).
As we have already done in the previous section for the N DC property, we study a system in which more than one high user acts on the system by considering these components as high users, i.e., if C ∈ C 1 n there are n high processes. Also in this case, as before, we distinguish between a centralized notion of BN DC (CBN DC) and a decentralized one (DBN DC).
Firstly we specify the CBN DC, in which we consider the unspecified part of the system as a context that can perform a vector of actions.
n be a context and let C n 0,H be the set of n-ary High context. C is CBN DC if and only if:
whereÑ il is the n-ary context that does not perform any action.
Secondly, we take in account, a decentralized notion of BN DC, called DBN DC, in which we consider the unspecified part of the system as several independent contexts composed by product operation. Definition 3.9 Let C ∈ C m n be a context and let C 1 0,H be the set of unary High context. C is DBN DC if and only if:
where, according to the rule of the product operation, the product
In order to compare Definition 3.8 and Definition 3.9 we give the following result. However the vice-versa of the Proposition 3.10 does not hold as the following example shows.
Example 3.11 Let us consider now a context
where C is the same context of the Example 2.9. In order to make this example readable we use the infix notation that is more suitable than the prefix one in order to point out why the two approaches differ.
As in the Example 2.9, firstly we consider to combine D with another context
0 . Here we show that D is not CBN DC. As a matter of fact by calculating
Now, we want to prove that D is DBN DC. It is not difficult to note that the possible contexts that can interact with D and make an attack are
N il, for the first component and P 2 =h 2 * • N il for the second one. It is possible to prove
First of all we calculate:
In the first case, by calculating D • (P 1 × P 2 ) we obtain:
that it is weakly bisimilar to
In the second case, by calculating D • (P 1 × P 2 ) we obtain:
It is interesting to note that the context P ∈ C 2 0 is an example of a process that can not be written as product of two unary context, i.e., there are not any P 1 , P 2 ∈ C 1 0 such that P 1 × P 2 is weakly bisimilar to P . Hence the main difference between the CBN DC and DBN DC is that, in the centralized case, the universal quantification is made on contexts in
To sum up, if we consider the trace equivalence as behavioral equivalence among contexts, we do not have any differences between the centralized and decentralized approaches for information flow specification, i.e., there are no differences between CN DC and DN DC. On the other hand, if we consider bisimulation equivalence, the two approaches are different. This depends on the fact that it is not possible to give a static characterization of BN DC in terms of a finite context (see [8] ). Since the BN DC property is a particular case both CBN DC and DBN DC, we can conclude that there is no finite contexts playing the same role as T op n for the trace case for statically characterize neither CBN DC or DBN DC.
Related work
In [9] the authors have studied the information flow properties in the setting of mobile agents. They have considered a distributed system with several unspecified locations and have studied when the system is secure w.r.t. information flow considering that an agent performs a different action for each different location. They refer to this property as mobile BN DC, M BN DC for short. Moreover they study the relation that exists between Persistent BN DC and M BN DC. However they do not present any verification method in order to analyze M BN DC. Also in our work we show a method to define the information flow property for distributed system. In our specification there are several high user that can also interact one to each other. This is not the case of M BN DC in which a single process passes from a location to another by performing a set of action in each location, sequentially.
In [1] the authors have studied which could be the effect of the environment on the information flow security in a multilevel system by referring to the context theory. Indeed, they introduce the notion of secure contexts for a class of processes as a parametric notion w.r.t. both the observation equivalence and the operation to characterize the low level views of a process. Our work can be consider an extension of this one in which we consider more then one high user.
In [20] the authors pointed out that in general BN DC is not compositional w.r.t. all the process algebras operators. This results is an extension of the one given in [15] , in which there is the proof that BN DC is not compositional w.r.t. parallel operators. Moreover, in [20] , the author has defined several properties stronger of BN DC in order to have properties that are compositional w.r.t. process algebras operators. In this work we have proposed a different specification of the problem that takes in account the environment of the system. BN DC has been also studied in the distributed model of elementary net systems in [2] , where however the idea is to consider one unique intruder, in the same line of centralized BN DC.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper we presented a possible extension of the specification of information flow properties also to a framework in which more than one high level user is active. Then we have extended the approach, based on the open system paradigm used to specify information flow properties such as BN DC with one high level user, to deal with such a more complex scenario.
We aim to extend this research by considering also the verification problem. We are working on a method to verify both centralized and distributed BN DC. Moreover we will also investigate what could happen if some unspecified components of the analyzed partially specified system can perform low actions. In particular we could consider that the unspecified components of the system are not only possible malicious agents but could also be generic processes that can perform high actions as well as low ones.
Moreover we intend to deal with enforcement mechanisms for monitoring information flow properties in distributed system. In particular, we would like to extend the work in [16] to define and synthesize controller operators also for the properties defined in this work.
A Technical proofs
Before the proof of Proposition 3.4 and 3.6 we give the following lemmata.
Proof: Let S be the binary relation defined as follows:
The thesis follows immediately if relation S is a strong simulation. But this derives trivially from the definition of T op n , as it can perform any vector of high actions. Indeed, if Cã −→ C , then T op nã −→ T op n with (C , T op n ) ∈ S. Hence we have the thesis.
2
Lemma A.2 Let C, D ∈ C n 0 be two contexts. The following hold:
This means that computations of length one performed by C are matched by corresponding computations of length one performed by D. Inductively, one can prove that if Cã 
r(C) ⊆ T r(D) and T r(D) ⊆ T r(C).
This implies that C ≈ T D.
Proof:The proof is divided into two parts:
For Lemma A.1, X ≺ T op n . Since ≺ is a pre-congruence for context, i.e., it is a congruence and a pre-order, we have that \ H m C(X) ≺ \ H m C(T op n ). Hence, for Lemma A. 2 
, \ H m C(X) ≤ T \ H m C(T op n ).
A similar reasoning is done by noticing thatÑ il ≺ X. Hence, by applying the previous lemmata, we have that \ For the semantics definition of T op 1 , we consider that the first component of the product performs a 1 , the second one a 2 , and so on. Hence, from the semantic definition of T op 1 
